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RECONSIDERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TEACHING THE LAW 
OF THE POLICE 
RACHEL HARMON* 
Around the country, few legal topics seem more relevant than how to 
govern the police. Videos of police violence and claims of misconduct pop up 
on the Internet and then in the news, and debates ensue. Was the conduct 
legitimate? Should the officers involved be prosecuted, sued, or fired? How 
can we ensure this never happens again? And so on. Yet graduates from 
American law schools are almost entirely unprepared to participate in these 
discussions. They leave law school knowing next to nothing about the myriad 
legal rules that govern policing, the ways police can be encouraged to comply 
with those rules, or what legal solutions fit which problems. Worse yet, they 
are unaware of their ignorance. Instead, they are led to believe that courses in 
criminal procedure enable them to understand policing and its regulation. 
Criminal procedure courses are useful for preparing students for criminal 
practice, and they are a wonderful way to study the Supreme Court and 
constitutional law. I love teaching Criminal Procedure. But a criminal 
procedure course doesn’t teach students much about the law governing 
policing. If anything, it presents students with a distorted view of how the 
police are regulated, one that is left uncorrected by the rest of the traditional 
law school curriculum. In this brief Article, I describe a course I teach to fill 
that gap, entitled “The Law of the Police.” 
I.  WHY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ISN’T THE LAW OF THE POLICE 
It isn’t that criminal procedure courses don’t talk about policing. Of 
course, they do. Courses that cover investigative criminal procedure teach 
vintage Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases like Mapp v. Ohio,1 Katz v. United 
States,2 and Miranda v. Arizona;3 and newfangled ones, such as Kentucky v. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to Andrew Manns and 
the University of Virginia Law School’s research librarians for excellent research assistance, and 
to Bob Newman for his helpful comments. 
 1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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King4 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.5 All of these cases self-consciously regulate 
the police. But that is actually part of the problem. The constant talk about 
policing can persuade students and professors alike that they are considering 
how we do and should control the police with law when, in fact, criminal 
procedure can never have such reach. 
Traditional investigative criminal procedure classes primarily focus on 
Fourth Amendment doctrine and the exclusionary remedy, Fifth Amendment 
law including Miranda doctrine, and perhaps throw in a little Due Process or 
Sixth Amendment law. To understand this law, students read Supreme Court 
cases. These cases give students the primary doctrinal tools they need to advise 
police departments about the constitutionality of investigative activities, and to 
write and respond to motions to suppress evidence arising from government 
searches and interrogations.6 They also allow students to evaluate the Court’s 
capacity to address changing technology, to protect individual privacy, and to 
set functional rules for the police. And they manage these chores while 
addressing some of the most interesting, important, and newsworthy legal 
questions of the day, such as whether the Fourth Amendment applies to 
attaching a GPS device to a car to track its movements,7 or whether police 
officers need a warrant to search a cell phone following arrest.8 Criminal 
procedure courses engage these fascinating questions, give students working 
knowledge of a useful area of law, and convey theory, policy, and a sense of 
the evolution of the law over time, all by focusing mostly on one court’s 
interpretation of a few sentences of the Constitution over little more than half a 
century. No wonder students love them. 
As wonderful as criminal procedure is, however, it misleads students about 
the project of governing policing. Criminal procedure cases treat regulating the 
police as something largely done by the Supreme Court, mostly using 
constitutional law. More specifically, the heart of the course is located in 
Warren Court era cases, such as Mapp, Katz, and Miranda, and the 
contemporary doctrines that flow from them. These cases establish a 
framework in which the Supreme Court imposes and enforces conduct rules 
found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and those rules constitute the most 
 
 4. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
 5. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
 6. This trait is visible in most of the major casebooks on criminal procedure. The one major 
exception is Wright and Miller’s innovative casebook. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (4th ed. 2011). 
Though it still adopts the conceptual framework of Supreme Court doctrine—an inevitability 
given the substantive focus of these courses—it considers a much broader range of materials and 
sources of regulation than traditional criminal procedure books. 
 7. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 8. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
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important means of regulating the police.9 Though much of any criminal 
procedure course is about how subsequent cases have cut away at the broad 
gestures made by the Warren Court, the underlying enterprise looks the same 
when we teach recent cases. Whether the Court steps in firmly, regulates 
loosely, or refuses to regulate at all, the vision is one in which federal courts 
are the primary actors; constitutional doctrine and the exclusionary rule are 
their primary tools; and criminal investigation is the primary policing practice 
in need of regulation. 
Given the regulatory architecture built into the Supreme Court’s cases, 
even an expansive approach to the topic cannot reveal accurately the law 
governing the police. A professor might include a federal privacy statute to 
illustrate congressional action beyond constitutional law. The Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978,10 for instance, illustrates the legislative 
response to United States v. Miller, which ruled that bank customers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their financial records.11 A course might 
include a state statute regulating police activities beyond constitutional 
protections, such as one of several that have recently mandated recording 
custodial interrogations.12 But expanding the range of materials does not solve 
the conceptual problem that exists in a course organized around the Supreme 
Court’s doctrines about what constitutes a search or a seizure, what exceptions 
exist for warrants, and whether there has been a Miranda waiver: these 
additional laws and doctrines are situated in relation to—and often are 
expressly a reaction to—the rulings of the Court. As a result, rather than 
undermine the centrality of constitutional law in regulating policing, they 
confirm it. The extra materials reinforce a picture of the law in which the 
Supreme Court monitors police to ensure that they are not overeager because 
states do not effectively do so. When the Court is too hesitant, other less 
prominent watchdogs may step in, but these second-string regulators fill local 
gaps in a legal scheme designed by the Court. 
By my count, there are at least six significant problems with the Court-and-
Constitution-centric view if one is trying to convey the nature of the interaction 
between policing and law. 
First, the view misleads students about the regulated industry, policing. In 
constitutional law, police mostly investigate crime. But a more realistic 
description of contemporary policing would view criminal law more often as a 
tool for police pursuing other objectives like protecting public order and 
 
 9. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 767 (2012) 
[hereinafter Harmon, The Problem of Policing]. 
 10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). 
 11. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 12. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/5-401.5 (2014); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/103-2.1 
(2014); D.C. CODE §§ 5-116.01–5-11.03 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (2005). 
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preventing crime. This is not merely a matter of how little criminal 
investigation police officers actually do. It is hard to make sense of most 
contemporary debates about policing strategies, such as broken windows 
policing, problem solving policing, and third party policing, if one thinks 
enforcing criminal law is the enterprise that motivates policing. 
Second, this view misstates the comparative importance of state 
institutions and federal courts. State legislatures, especially, are secondary, if 
not invisible, in criminal procedure. But state statutes create police officers, 
determine what qualifications and training they possess, and empower and 
command officers to coerce citizens. State laws often regulate the structure of 
police departments and limit how municipalities use law enforcement to raise 
revenue. And states set the parameters of officer accountability by establishing 
criminal and civil remedies for misconduct, by determining whether officers 
engage in collective bargaining, by providing administrative protections 
through civil service law and/or a Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, 
and by designing the administrative schemes for certifying and decertifying 
officers. Even assuming state constitutional law has little bite beyond federal 
constitutional law, there is no question that contemporary policing is heavily 
influenced by state legislative action. 
Third, and relatedly, the Court-and-Constitution approach obscures many 
kinds of law governing the police, and state legislation is not all that is 
missing. Procedure courses disregard other non-constitutional federal law that 
regulates policing, including labor and employment law, employment 
discrimination statutes, and statutes authorizing federal equipment and grant 
programs that subsidize some (but not other) kinds of policing. Criminal 
procedure classes rarely address federal and state common law defenses that 
regulate police conduct, such as entrapment and the public authority defense—
which are not always enacted into statutes. Perhaps most egregiously, law 
school courses overlook much of the non-constitutional law that governs the 
limited range of police conduct actually considered in criminal procedure, that 
is, searches, seizures, and interrogations. For instance, at the most local level, 
students won’t learn about city ordinances that forbid police from interrogating 
suspects about their immigration status or departmental general orders that 
restrict officers from using chokeholds to subdue suspects.13 At the most global 
 
 13. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H (2007) (making San Francisco a refuge city 
and, inter alia, prohibiting the use of local funds to question individuals about their immigration 
status); CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-173-020 (2015) (prohibiting officers from asking about immigration 
status); PORTLAND, ME., CODE § 2-21 (2015) (same); N.Y.C., N.Y., PATROL GUIDE § 203-11 
(2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/pg203-11-use-of-force.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/PR2Y-YYUK] (prohibiting the use of chokeholds); Atlanta, Ga. Police Department Policy 
Manual, Use of Force, APD.SOP.3010 4.1.7. (Oct. 30, 2013) (prohibiting neck restraints or 
chokeholds except in limited emergency situations); Fort Worth, Tex. Police Department, General 
Order Revision 306.04 (June 30, 2008) (prohibiting chokeholds). 
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level, students walk away with no idea that the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations directly prohibits police officers in the United States 
from handcuffing, arresting, and stopping foreign diplomatic and consular 
personnel, entering their residences or cars, or searching their other property, 
in addition to its (more) well-known provisions prohibiting the government 
from prosecuting them.14 
Fourth, the Court-and-Constitution approach suggests that the primary 
measure of whether police action is problematic is whether it violates the 
Constitution. Taking criminal procedure, one might think that good policing 
and legal policing are almost synonymous, and that to the degree they are not, 
it is because the Court gets the doctrine wrong.15 Even if a teacher doesn’t 
share this view, criminal procedure cases offer little in the way of other bases 
for evaluating police conduct, such as cost effectiveness or whether the 
individual and aggregate harms they induce are necessary and proportional to 
benefits they entail.16 
Fifth, criminal procedure courses usually highlight one—or at best two—
of the law’s mechanisms for discouraging constitutional violations, namely, the 
exclusionary rule and maybe § 1983.17 Professors usually have no time to 
discuss other constitutional remedies, such as criminal prosecution and civil 
suits for equitable relief. Nor do they have the inclination to teach other law 
that incentivizes police conduct beyond constitutional compliance, such as 
state decertification laws or accreditation programs for departments. At best, 
they can raise their existence when they are implicated by one footnote in Wolf 
v. Colorado,18 a sentence or two and a concurrence in Mapp v. Ohio,19 and a 
controversial couple of paragraphs in Hudson v. Michigan.20 They can hardly 
do much more. 
Finally, even if one were willing to overlook the significant kinds of 
policing, laws, regulatory actors, policing problems, and remedies that criminal 
procedure neglects—that is, even within the limited realm of deterring Fourth 
 
 14. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 15. For alternative views, see Harmon, The Problem of Policing, supra note 9, at 763, and 
Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing 
and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865 (2013). 
 16. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 870, 872–74 (2015) [hereinafter Harmon, Federal Programs]. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 18. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949). 
 19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–53 (1961) (discussing other remedies); id. at 670–71 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
 20. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–99 (2006) (suggesting that civil suits for 
damages and internal disciplinary mechanisms make evidentiary exclusion unnecessary to 
prevent knock-and-announce violations). 
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and Fifth Amendment violations using the exclusionary rule—criminal 
procedure cases hide the most significant fact of policing for those interested in 
accountability: police operate only in departments. Criminal procedure cases 
imagine police officers like characters in a massive multiplayer online game 
who appear fully formed and alone each day in a virtual world and wander 
around interacting with others—albeit engaged in criminal investigation and 
traffic patrol rather than exploration and warfare. In the Court’s artificial 
environment, constitutional wrongs are simple things: police officers avoid 
them by simply refraining from committing them. All an officer need do is 
give Miranda warnings when he should, have probable cause when it is 
demanded, and avoid hack and slash play (as close combat games are 
sometimes called). 
In the real world, however, there are no free-roaming police officers. 
Police exist only in departments with politically accountable chiefs, which are 
themselves agencies of governments made up of politically accountable elected 
officials. Police departments govern in minute detail what police do each day, 
what they learn, what rules they follow (or violate), what records they keep, 
and what incentives they receive, both positive and negative. Ambiguous 
policies, weak training, double messaging about what police are expected to 
do, and other conditions in departments have enormous influence over what 
law enforcement looks like on the street.21 Moreover, almost every effort to 
prevent police misconduct—except perhaps for throwing a police officer in 
prison—requires going through departments to influence officers. Police 
departments are the real engines for police-citizen encounters, something the 
inevitably incident- and officer-specific approach of constitutional criminal 
procedure cannot capture. 
Students should take criminal procedure. But they shouldn’t walk away 
believing they understand how to think about regulating the police. Such 
courses are simply an insufficient lens into policing, and they do not give 
students the basis for answering basic questions about governing the police, 
about comparative institutional competence, about political responsiveness, or 
about how law should be used to influence police practice. Instead, these 
matters should be the subject of their own course. 
II.  THE CONTENT OF THE LAW OF THE POLICE 
If this reasoning describes why I teach The Law of the Police, it also 
suggests how. The goal of the course is to evaluate the many ways we regulate 
police conduct and the tradeoffs among them. To that end, I emphasize four 
 
 21. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004) (discussing the role of police departments in shaping police 
conduct). 
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questions: (1) What is policing like? (2) What are the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of the various institutions and forms of law that can 
influence police conduct? (3) How do different legal remedies and other 
accountability mechanisms influence different kinds of police conduct? (4) 
What are the preconditions for effective regulation of the police? 
Correspondingly, the course has four parts. The first is an introduction to the 
institution we are studying, local policing, including the legal and political 
structures that underlie it. The second looks at the rules that constrain and 
empower police conduct. The third looks at legal remedies and other 
mechanisms for inducing socially desirable police conduct. And the last 
considers the role of information in regulating the police, and how law 
influences what kinds of information and data about policing are produced and 
distributed. 
A. Introductory Materials 
My class starts with several sessions introducing policing to the students 
and giving them some ways to think about how we govern it. These 
introductory materials and lectures are designed to answer some basic 
questions: What is a police officer? How is policing created by law? What does 
the contemporary enterprise of policing look like in the United States? Why is 
it a subject for so much law? By starting with these questions, I hope to build 
from scratch an idea of policing and its relationship to law that replaces the one 
embedded in criminal procedure. 
In some significant part, these basic questions originate in my own 
experience studying the law governing the police. I entered the legal academy 
after nearly a decade in practice, most of which was spent prosecuting civil 
rights crimes. Many of my cases involved investigating and prosecuting police 
officers for excessive force or sexual assault, and I intended my scholarship to 
focus on the police. Yet, as much as I thought I knew from practice, I 
discovered I had little idea why police officers exist or where their powers 
come from. Maybe I am especially slow, but it took me some time to figure out 
how the law creates contemporary policing, and longer still to develop the 
conceptual basis for thinking critically about regulating the police. I try to 
make that process a little faster for my students. 
Towards this end, I start with a series of state statutes that authorize the 
existence of local police departments, provide police power, and set 
qualifications and certification requirements for officers.22 In discussion, I 
draw out the legal story of policing: the Constitution reserves public safety to 
the states; states largely delegate the creation and governance of the police to 
 
 22. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-700, 15.2-1701, 15.2-1704, 15.2-1705, 15.2-1706, 15.2-
1718, 15.2-1722 (2014). 
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local municipalities; municipalities create and fund departments and hold them 
politically accountable through the chief.23 This discussion sets up two early 
themes of the course. One is that state actors are key to shaping police conduct, 
especially during an era of permissive constitutional regulation of the police.24 
The second is a more general legal principle: legal authority isn’t some gestalt 
kind of thing. It has rule, reason, and limits. Police—with their coercive 
authority to arrest and even to kill—don’t just exist, free to act save 
constitutional constraints. Though states vary in their approaches to giving 
police power, police officers have (and have to have) some kind of legal origin 
and authority. Otherwise, they would be kidnappers and killers, not public 
officials performing essential public duties. 
Finally, these statutes allow me to draw out what I suggested above is the 
most important fact about public policing for those interested in influencing 
police behavior: police officers don’t exist outside of departments. Talking 
about police conduct means taking departments seriously because departments 
are the principal determinant of police conduct. As a result, there are two 
targets of legal regulation of law enforcement: officers and departments. 
The hardest part of my early materials is an old essay by Egon Bittner, 
Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police.25 It is 
dated, dense, and slow going, as I note in the course materials. It also has the 
downside of misleading students about the nature of future course materials 
since most of the rest are more expressly legal, primarily cases and statutes. I 
assign it every year anyway because it is the best thing I have ever read on 
policing, and I find myself returning to its themes again and again during the 
rest of the course. Bittner argues that “police are empowered and required to 
impose or, as the case may be, coerce a provisional solution upon emergent 
problems without having to brook or defer to opposition of any kind, and that 
further, their competence to intervene extends to every kind of emergency, 
without any exceptions whatever.”26 
If students take the time to parse the article, Bittner’s theory nicely sets up 
my way of framing the special predicament policing poses. We cannot easily 
forgo an institution capable of imposing solutions to problems that threaten 
personal safety or public order. But, once such an institution exists, coercion is 
an almost inescapable consequence. That is, there is an inexorable link 
 
 23. Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 16, at 876–77. Although I touch on sheriffs’ 
offices, and federal and state law enforcement agencies, the focus of my course is on local police 
departments. 
 24. For additional thoughts about the role of the state in regulating the police, see Roger 
Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363 (2016). 
 25. Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, 
in 1 POLICING: COPS, CRIME AND CONTROL: ANALYZING THE POLICE FUNCTION 155 (Robert 
Reiner ed., 1996). 
 26. Id. at 156. 
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between police and violence, even if officers rarely use force. The potential for 
facing and having to use violence explains why police will view their job as 
risky, even if few get killed in a given year. A cab driver might get mugged, 
but for an officer, risk of harm is implicit in the nature of the task. The 
potential for violence also explains why no amount of community engagement 
with Officer Friendly can ease all unease about the police. And it starts to 
move students away from a criminal-system-centric view of regulating law 
enforcement. 
This year, I expanded this lesson and introduced race into the course early 
by following Bittner with a recent article by Ta-Nehisi Coates.27 Coates argues 
policing largely works for the public in general because people believe in the 
authority of officers and follow their commands. The implication is that the 
police therefore use limited force against most members of the public, and 
most members of the public assume that police use mostly acceptable force. By 
contrast, the African American community’s historical experience with 
policing leads to a deep skepticism about police legitimacy, one that 
contributes to resistance to police commands. That in turn leads police to use 
force, which in turn sustains views about the failure of police legitimacy. This 
reading enabled my students to see that police violence depends not only on 
what individual officers do when confronted with resistance, but also on what 
problems are left to the police to solve. 
Since the Bittner article is old, it naturally encourages me to talk about 
how policing has changed over time. For example, in Bittner’s view, a key 
characteristic of policing is that it is largely unobserved and unobservable. 
Though some aspects of policing retain this quality, it is far less true today in 
the world of car radios, computer assisted dispatch, GPS, and ubiquitous 
cameras than when Bittner wrote in the early 1970s. More generally, I use this 
opportunity to argue that making policing visible is only one of the many 
consequences of changing technology: Tasers and other new non-deadly 
weapons allow officers to be less injurious at a distance; in-car computers and 
fingerprint scanners allow officers to identify individuals more quickly; early 
intervention systems increase accountability; and body armor makes officers 
safer, just to name a few examples. And pushing up one more level of 
generality still, technology is only one of several features of the world outside 
of the project of policing that dictates its characteristics. I try to show that 
human physiology and geography, for example, also inevitably shape the 
nature of policing: force becomes necessary in part due to the fact that police 
 
 27. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Myth of Police Reform, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-myth-of-police-reform/390057/ 
[http://perma.cc/6PAB-AHFM]. 
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are human beings vulnerable to injury and limited in speed and strength;28 
frisks are an issue in New York, but not in Los Angeles, because so many more 
people are walking the streets. 
All this is to say Bittner is well worth the slog. I supplement the Bittner 
article with a set of factual and statistical materials about police departments 
and the contemporary characteristics of policing as a project that helps me talk 
about the demographics of policing, the variations in police departments, the 
fragmented nature of American policing, and other characteristics of the 
project of policing, its officers, and its departments. 
I end my introduction to policing with materials on the economic analysis 
of public goods and public provision of services. Though not policing specific, 
these materials enable a conversation about the degree to which policing really 
is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and why it is organized locally and along 
political boundaries. Charles Wolf’s theory of non-market failures provides a 
vocabulary for talking about policing’s problems as predictable consequences 
of government action. In light of those failures, it is easier to understand how 
local governments might get policing wrong in ways state and federal 
regulation and subsidies might mitigate. I like these economic materials for 
two reasons. First, because they are not about policing, they allow students to 
see that even if policing is a singular enterprise in some ways, it is closely 
analogous to and connected with other public services, like education or public 
health, in others. Second, by the end of the introductory materials, the students 
have thought through a legal account of policing, Bittner’s more sociological 
theory, and this economic approach to the police. Doing this helps students 
studying law see that the world offers many alternate lenses to analyze any 
complex phenomenon. These alternative approaches become tools we return to 
throughout the course. 
B. Legal Standards for Policing 
The rest of the course is perhaps more easily summarized. The largest unit 
is on the law that tells police what to do and not to do. It works through some 
illustrative constitutional law on the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments; and then veers towards state statutes, federal programs, and 
internal departmental policies. My primary goal is to start students thinking 
about the limits of using courts and constitutional law for regulating the police 
and considering some alternative forms of and institutional loci for legal 
 
 28. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3–4 nn.2–3 (1985) (“I couldn’t get to him 
because of the fence here. I couldn’t have jumped this fence and come up, consequently jumped 
this fence and caught him before he got away because he was already up on the fence, just one 
leap and he was already over the fence, and so there is no way that I could have caught him.”) 
(quoting the officer who shot Garner, an unarmed, fleeing eighth grader); id. at 4 n.3. (noting that 
the officer testified that “Garner, being younger and more energetic, could have outrun him”). 
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regulation. Clearly, this section—like the rest of the course—reflects my own 
writing on and interests in policing. In The Problem of Policing29 in 2012, I 
argued that constitutional law has been too prominent in academic 
conversation about policing and is an inevitably limited tool for regulating the 
police, and in other articles, such as a recent one on federal public safety 
programs, I have considered some of the alternative approaches.30 
It is ironic to start with constitutional law in a course designed to decenter 
it. But it works well to have students reread canonical cases from criminal 
procedure with a new agenda, that is, to see what these cases reveal about the 
role of the courts and constitutional law in governing the police. Thus, our 
discussion in class is much less on the rules the Court imposes than on what 
the Court’s reasoning and rules say about what risks the Court views policing 
as posing, and whether and how the Court thinks the police should be 
constrained. 
For example, though I do not teach them together, I use Katz,31 Mapp v. 
Ohio (which comes up a little later),32 and Miranda33 to demonstrate the 
dominant Warren Court approach to policing. In these cases, the problem that 
policing poses is the risk that individual officers, motivated by professional 
commitment, may sometimes overeagerly enforce criminal law. This view is 
perhaps best represented by the oft-repeated argument that judicial oversight is 
necessary to monitor “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”34 All three cases also explain the Court’s view of why 
federal intervention is justified to address this problem, since they portray 
states as failed regulators of the police. This is hardest to show in Katz in 
which the rhetoric highlights the advantages of judges and magistrates as 
neutral arbiters who can check police behavior. But I argue to the students that 
the Court strongly emphasizes pre-clearing searches through warrants only 
because it views state courts as unable or unwilling to disbelieve police 
officers and exclude relevant, probative evidence obtained in illegal searches 
after the searches have taken place. Thus, together these cases show the 
Warren Court’s belief that federally generated procedural solutions could 
effectively ameliorate policing’s substantive problems better than other 
regulators could. The Court as a regulator interacting with other potential 
regulators might come up in criminal procedure, but, here, it is a focal point of 
the discussion. Finally, these cases illustrate some problems with the Court’s 
 
 29. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, supra note 9, at 763. 
 30. Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 16, at 875–76. 
 31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 32. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 34. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). One of my students, Eric Hintz, gave 
us a label for this approach—the “competitive ferrets” theory of the problem of policing. 
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approach, including the almost ineluctable erosion of procedural protections 
intended to deter misconduct when judges apply them, as they must, one 
criminal defendant at a time. Of course, as Terry shows, the Court itself 
recognized that this view of the problems with policing is partial. Still, it is 
nevertheless the one that dominates criminal procedure cases, and it is one that 
is deeply embedded in contemporary understanding of how police are and 
should be regulated. 
In most of my constitutional law assignments, I also pair traditional cases 
with contemporary ones, sometimes ones decided by lower courts. I match 
Katz v. United States35 with Kentucky v. King,36 for example; Terry v. Ohio37 
with Floyd v. City of New York;38 and Miranda v. Arizona39 with a less well-
known case, People v. Smith.40 These newer cases illustrate the changing views 
of courts about police over time. King, for instance, bespeaks much more 
concern about courts interfering with effective law enforcement than with 
states as inadequate police regulators. The newer cases also reveal some of the 
unintended consequences of constitutional regulation. Floyd is especially 
helpful for this point because the police practice that is its subject—New York 
City’s stop, question, and frisk policy—demonstrates how the Terry Court’s 
reluctant acceptance of frisks transforms over time into an affirmative strategy 
that generates a mind-boggling number of coercive police interactions with 
citizens, the overwhelming majority of which were legal by any measure.41 
Each year, I also add contemporary examples of policing problems to this 
part of the course. Most recently, for example, I used the transcript and video 
of the Sandra Bland arrest in Texas42 and, right after teaching the use of force 
cases, the video of tennis star James Blake’s arrest in New York43 to test the 
lessons we draw from the constitutional case law, to evaluate the law, and to 
illustrate its ambiguities. I ask students: How does the law apply? Is it clear? 
 
 35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
 36. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
 37. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 38. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y 2013). 
 39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 40. People v. Smith, 150 P.3d 1224 (Cal. 2007). 
 41. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 582. 
 42. Full Sandra Bland Arrest Video, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/vid 
eo/full-sandra-bland-arrest-video/824DEC23-4137-453B-83AC-0AC636C91683.html [http://per 
ma.cc/D2DC-WGYR] (including the transcript). 
 43. Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Officer Who Arrested James Blake Has History of 
Force Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/nyregion/ 
video-captures-new-york-officer-manhandling-tennis-star-during-arrest.html [http://perma.cc/6D 
38-HBRK] (describing arrest and providing embedded video); N.Y.C. Police Dep’t., Surveillance 
Video of James Blake Arrest, N.Y. TIMES: TIMES VIDEO (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/video/nyregion/100000003905322/surveillance-video-of-james-blake-arrest.html [http://per 
ma.cc/XAS6-B9J8]. 
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Does the law get the answer right? If a given arrest, whether legal or not, is not 
an example of good police practice, how else could you prevent it? I tell them 
to imagine the facts tweaked slightly and I ask again. The contemporary 
illustrations show students that they can develop a means of analyzing police 
action and its legal structure, one that they can use in the future. It is a 
significant reward of teaching the course that students feel empowered as 
consumers of and participants in contemporary debates about policing. 
This part of the course includes other Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases, 
and some First and Fourteenth Amendment cases, most commonly Colten v. 
Kentucky,44 Houston v. Hill,45 and City of Chicago v. Morales.46 Still, I try not 
to get too bogged down in constitutional law so that I have time to turn to other 
sources of regulation. I do this horizontally by showing how Congress and 
federal courts interact with one another over policing. Excerpts from Berger v. 
New York47 and Title III (the Wiretap Act),48 and from Smith v. Maryland49 and 
the Pen Register Act50 and the Stored Communications Act of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act51 provide easily digestible examples, and I add 
some academic excerpts about the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
courts and legislators as regulators. Then, I teach more vertically, showing 
interactions among federal, state, and local actors trying to influence the 
police. I wrote on this recently in Federal Programs and the Real Costs of 
Policing,52 an article that developed from teaching the course. In the course, I 
teach an expanded version of some of the examples in the article, such as the 
problems of policing domestic violence and immigration, to illustrate how 
various government institutions interact in attempting to influence policing. 
Immigration policing provides an especially fun example. Each year, it 
seems, I add another little chapter. Though it could start earlier, I begin the 
story with section 287(g), a statute permitting federal officials to delegate 
federal civil immigration enforcement power to state and local police. The 
program that arose demonstrates one way that federal actors can expand the 
power of local police officers and encourage them to pursue federal ends.53 
 
 44. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
 45. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
 46. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
 47. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 48. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2002)). 
 49. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 50. Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
 51. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012)). 
 52. Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 16. 
 53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, sec. 133, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). In the non-
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The section 287(g) law is implemented by United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) in section 287(g) agreements, which are 
represented in my materials by a short excerpt from a now-defunct 
“Memorandum of Agreement” between ICE and the Phoenix, Arizona Police 
Department.54 We talk about why localities or states would enter into such 
agreements, and then consider a piece of the United States Government 
Accountability Office report in 2009 criticizing ICE’s management of section 
287(g) on the ground that state and local agencies were implementing the 
agreements in ways that clearly conflicted with federal immigration 
priorities.55 I have a note in the materials about how ICE revamped the section 
287(g) program to induce better compliance with federal policies. At this point, 
they read Senate Bill 1070,56 the Arizona statute passed in 2010, in part as a 
reaction to section 287(g) program changes. Because Senate Bill 1070 
constituted a broad and strict anti-illegal immigrant statute and attempted to 
subvert the limits the federal government was imposing on local and state 
actors in enforcing immigration law, it, too, generated a response. That brings 
us to a summary of Arizona v. United States,57 the Supreme Court’s review of 
the administration’s constitutional challenge to Senate Bill 1070, a lawsuit 
which one might see as the federal effort to hit the ball back over the net. I 
include quotes from Arizona Governor Jan Brewer and President Obama who, 
despite being on opposite sides of the case, both declared victory after the 
Court’s opinion.58 Then comes Secure Communities,59 the federal executive 
 
immigration context, I use a few federal grant programs and the Justice Department’s Equitable 
Sharing Program, which until recently distributed money to state and local police to encourage 
them to seize assets under federal law, to illustrate the same point. 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (Mar. 10, 2008) 
(agreement between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Phoenix Police 
Department), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/phoenix 
policedepartment.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TDA-LCJM]. 
 55. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT 
OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009). 
 56. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 450 (codified as amended in various sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. titles 11, 13, 23, 
28, and 41) (invalidated in part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)). 
 57. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 58. See Statement on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on Arizona’s Illegal 
Immigrant Enforcement Legislation, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00509 (June 25, 2012) 
(stating that the President was “pleased that the Supreme Court has struck down key provisions of 
Arizona’s immigration law”); Tom Cohen & Bill Mears, Supreme Court Mostly Rejects Arizona 
Immigration Law; Gov Says “Heart” Remains, CNN (June 26, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012 
/06/25/politics/scotus-arizona-law/ [http://perma.cc/CYU3-S3JV] (quoting Brewer as calling the 
decision “a victory for the people of Arizona and for America”); id. (embedded video with 
comments by Brewer). 
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effort to rejigger local involvement in federal immigration enforcement and 
deemphasize section 287(g). The program used federal databases to identify 
immigration violators when they were booked into local jails and sought local 
help in detaining the individuals for the purpose of facilitating deportation. 
Next, I provide examples of the ways police departments, municipalities, and 
states resisted Secure Communities, including, for example, the California 
Trust Act.60 Recently, I added the demise of Secure Communities in favor of 
yet a new executive effort to shape local participation in federal immigration 
enforcement, the Priority Enforcement Program. This ongoing volley over 
immigration demonstrates beautifully how different government actors affect 
what police officers do in the street and how they sometimes compete to do so. 
I address similar issues through other federal programs, such as the Arrest 
Program from the Violence Against Women Act, which I use for other 
purposes as well,61 but alternatives never have the same recency, concision, or 
oomph. 
C. Changing Police Conduct 
The third part of the course explores remedies or—as I like to think about 
them—legal mechanisms for encouraging police to do what we want them to 
do and to forgo the rest. In criminal procedure courses, almost by definition, 
the exclusionary rule dominates. If one starts looking at Fourth Amendment 
law from the perspective of the criminal process rather than as one of many 
constraints on police action, the exclusionary rule is central because it is the 
mechanism by which the criminal process sees Fourth Amendment claims. The 
exclusionary rule is so important that many professors—and I am one of 
them—start criminal procedure courses with Mapp, then teach about the 
Fourth Amendment right, before circling back to contemporary case law on 
explicating the exclusionary rule and its exceptions. It is not a stretch to say 
that criminal procedure is taught in the shadow of the exclusionary rule. This 
orients students to the practical question at the heart of criminal procedure—
whether a given piece of evidence is permissibly introduced in the criminal 
trial. It also shapes a strong narrative for professors. For those sympathetic to 
Mapp, the exclusionary rule worked well for a while but has been trimmed so 
many times in recent cases on causation, inevitable discovery, and, most 
importantly, the good faith exception that the rule has lost much of its power. 
 
 59. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, Megan Mack, Officer, 
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec’y for 
Intergovernmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PZR-RVNG]. 
 60. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282 (West 2015). 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796hh–3796hh-4 (2012) (authorizing the Arrest Program). 
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If you disfavor the rule, you can simply turn the chart upside down: despite 
defeat in Mapp, victory is now (almost) at hand. 
Teaching remedies in The Law of the Police has a different emphasis. 
Before we discuss specific remedies, I ask students first to consider why police 
obey or break the law. We talk about officers’ incentives, their understanding 
of law, and how they learn alternative strategies for interacting with citizens. 
We talk about what makes officers willing to comply with the laws and 
regulations that govern them, and what role departments play in generating 
these various conditions for officers. Only then do we consider comparatively 
how the exclusionary rule and other remedies fare as ways to induce 
constitutional conduct. 
My discussion of Mapp bypasses any consideration of whether Mapp is 
good constitutional law in favor of whether it is good regulation. Towards that 
end, I argue that evidentiary exclusion has a series of advantages, particularly 
when it is compared to damages actions. For instance, evidentiary exclusion 
depends on a plausible narrative about how one might influence police conduct 
(though the Court notably never really tells that story). In addition, as others 
have pointed out, it may deter without risking over-deterrence since it can only 
take away the value of the evidence from the officer and department. It also 
encourages prosecutors—who might be able to influence police practices—to 
care about constitutional violations by officers because they, too, share the 
evidentiary deprivation that comes from illegal conduct. 
Of course, as a form of police regulation, exclusion has drawbacks as well. 
It only applies when evidence is found and used in criminal cases. It only 
addresses a relatively narrow range of police conduct. After all, officers broke 
into Dollree Mapp’s house, lied to her, intimidated her, and roughed her up 
before finding evidence in a trunk in her basement.62 Excluding the mildly 
dirty books hardly feels like a real vindication of the interests at stake. Finally, 
as noted above, Mapp demands something of judges—excluding relevant, 
probative evidence and declaring police officers liars—that they are reluctant 
to do in order to secure the abstract benefits of deterrence. That makes it no 
surprise—the changing Court aside—that the exclusionary rule has been 
watered down over time.63 Though it has been enormously consequential in 
shaping the culture of policing and in generating Fourth Amendment law, it 
could never be adequate on its own to address what we care about in policing. 
 
 62. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644–45 (1961). 
 63. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to constitutional violations resulting from negligence); Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-
and-announce rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to evidence that was found as a result of a constitutional violation but would 
ultimately have been discovered even if the violation had not taken place). 
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I follow a day on the exclusionary rule with a day or two each on § 1983 
suits for damages, § 1983 suits for injunctive relief, § 14141 suits by the 
United States Department of Justice, and criminal prosecutions of the police. 
The project is largely comparative. Evidentiary exclusion works better for 
privacy invasions that cause little in the way of damages, and § 1983 suits 
work better for violations that don’t produce evidence. I include several district 
court cases that reveal that though suits for injunctive and equitable relief 
against police departments are limited by restrictions on standing in City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons,64 plaintiffs are most likely to get through Lyons’ gates when 
police are engaged in high-volume activities against distinctive and innocent 
populations. Criminal prosecution does little to improve behavior with 
systemic origins, and faces considerable legal and practical obstacles, but it 
fares better than the exclusionary rule as a suitable remedy for intentionally 
illegal, violent conduct when it is employed. 
As this discussion suggests, I encourage students to move beyond broad 
criticisms of the various remedies to consider when they might work best. In 
this vein, we discuss the common argument that damages actions do not easily 
translate into incentives for officers, and then we try to refine it. I ask students 
to consider the circumstances in which a financial penalty on a municipality 
might most influence a chief. Once we talk about the obstacles to turning 
economic costs into political ones, students usually suggest this might be in a 
small jurisdiction, where the obstacles to information transmission between 
municipal agencies are likely to be less serious, and in which payouts can 
visibly and meaningfully impose costs on voters. I confirm that this is 
consistent with my impression working with small departments, and they hear 
the same from Charlottesville’s visionary and charismatic police chief, Tim 
Longo, when he comes to talk to my class late in the term. 
The remedies section of the course also builds on my writing. Or, more 
accurately, the course builds on ideas that I have now published, but that I 
developed by teaching the course. By teaching the federal remedies one after 
the next and thinking about how to analyze them, it became clear to me, and 
now, I hope, to my students, that tweaking remedies for misconduct in the 
ways often proposed is unlikely to discourage bad policing much more than it 
does now. Several years ago, I made this argument in a short essay, Limited 
Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform,65 comparing various legal 
remedies for constitutional violations. In the article, I contend that the common 
federal remedies for constitutional violations by the police work either by 
increasing the costs of misconduct or by reducing its benefits. In order to 
strengthen deterrence, one would need to impose greater costs (or reduce 
 
 64. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934 (1980). 
 65. Rachel A. Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33 (2012). 
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benefits more) or one would need to employ the remedy more often. As I 
discuss in the essay, and consider with students in class, legal and practical 
limitations built into the exclusionary rule, § 1983 suits for damages, § 1983 
and § 1414166 litigation against departments for structural reform, and criminal 
prosecutions of officers ensure that these remedies are unlikely to become 
either dramatically more costly or more common. This argument prepares 
students to imagine alternative ways to influence police conduct. We discuss 
several, including federal programs that lower the costs of preventing 
misconduct for departments or provide rewards for pursuing reform. Then, we 
focus on a selection of non-constitutional means of influencing police 
practices, including state decertification of offending officers; restrictive 
conditions on federal public safety grant programs; federal programs that 
provide monetary subsidies, equipment, or technical assistance for reform; 
proposals to require insurance for officers and departments; citizen complaints 
and review boards; and administrative discipline. 
D. Information and the Police 
I devote several classes at the end of the course to the role of information 
in regulating the police,67 and how law determines what information about 
policing is generated, aggregated as data, distributed, and used. This unit is 
necessarily my most flexible because it gets less airtime if more is going on in 
policing that year or if I have a particularly conversational group. At a 
minimum, however, I hit several topics. The first is the range of information 
we care about in policing. They think immediately about proving what 
happened in specific police-citizen encounters, so I encourage them to 
articulate why regulators and voters might need aggregate data about coercion 
activities and research on the effectiveness and intrusiveness of various crime 
control techniques to make considered judgments about policing policy. 
Second, I use the topic of video recording by private citizens to illustrate how 
technology (primarily cell phones and video sharing websites) has facilitated 
public debate on policing. Video recording also provides a perfect example of 
how police sometimes resist accountability, and how law can permit (through 
arrests and prosecutions of those who record) or limit (through First 
Amendment doctrine, civil suits for injunctive relief, and departmental 
policies) that resistance. 
I often end with materials on police-generated video. The issue of video in 
interrogation rooms opens a discussion of video as an accountability 
mechanism, a discussion that continues with materials on dash cams and, more 
recently, body cameras. I try to provide a realistic view of the challenges and 
 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
 67. I also wrote a brief symposium paper about this topic. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Do We 
(Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2013). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] RECONSIDERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 409 
limits of video to counter the common view that body cameras are a silver 
bullet that can end police misconduct. At some point in this unit, we consider 
the Rodney King video and its significance, though the incident is increasingly 
both ancient and anti-climactic for students raised in the age of iPhones and 
YouTube. 
Though video is great fun to study, I worry that it confirms the preexisting 
student bias I noted earlier: it deemphasizes how the law generates broad data 
about policing in favor of a focus on how the law generates incident-specific 
information. This year, there has been so much written on the limitations of 
data on police killings that this bias has been easier to correct. In light of that 
attention, students can see more easily that if data on deaths at the hands of the 
police are weak, they are actually the easiest consequences of police coercion 
to count. Dead bodies are hard to hide. By contrast, there are not even agreed 
definitions about what constitutes a use of non-deadly force, much less any 
significant effort to collect regular data about how often it is used or what 
consequences it has that can be compared across departments. Once through 
with these aspects of the significance of information and the means of its 
production, if I have any additional days in the course, I add something about 
other laws that facilitate or discourage access to information, such as Freedom 
of Information laws and their exceptions, privacy laws, civil discovery rules, 
state racial profiling statutes, and the like. In practice, I rarely get the time. 
Though these units form the core of the course, I am always adding and 
removing materials and subjects. I used to teach the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations because I loved to show students that international law 
directly regulates local police.68 But the materials were too boring and the 
points too thin to justify the time. I have used entrapment cases to illustrate 
non-constitutional regulation by the courts, and public commissions on 
policing to illustrate an alternative approach to accountability, but these efforts 
at police regulation both have so little bite in the real world that they felt 
marginal to the project. I have taught and dropped a day solely on state 
criminal procedure statutes repeatedly, and have sometimes included more 
specific information on citizen complaint procedures and civilian review than I 
do now. Every year, I hope to add materials on unions and budgets rather than 
just discussing them along the way, but I never find the space. 
Beyond correcting (and overcorrecting) each year, I adjust the materials to 
contemporary events, focusing on Occupy Movement protests one year, then 
on the events in Ferguson last fall. I add newspaper articles and videos, 
sometimes liberally, in order to give the class problems to work through or to 
further illustrate a point. The class is not one in current events, but nor does it 
 
 68. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 14. 
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ignore the broader world. In fact, these present-day incursions are a highlight 
of the course for many students. 
E. Assessment 
Since the class is a course on law as regulation as much as doctrine, the 
exam necessarily looks different from most other law school exams. Here is 
one in full: 
EXAM 
1. In “Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the 
Police,” Egon Bittner asserted that police must be able to impose 
solutions upon the problems to which they are assigned “without 
having to brook or defer to opposition of any kind.” Yet granting 
absolute power to government officials is inconsistent with democratic 
self-governance. Analyze how and how well the legal doctrines and 
laws that govern the exercise of coercive authority by the police 
balance the power Bittner argues police officers must have with other 
concerns. 
2. Presently, two executive branch entities in New York State are heavily 
involved in policing. The State Attorney General is the top law 
enforcement officer in New York State. He has the power to prosecute 
police officers for criminal acts and to sue departments for structural 
reform, though no Attorney General has brought a structural reform 
suit in recent years. In addition, the New York Department of Criminal 
Justice Services provides state grants and technical assistance to police 
departments, sets training, hiring, and certification standards for police 
officers, and carries out police decertification. To address the problems 
in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and other 
departments in the state, a state legislator recently proposed combining 
the police-related activities of both the Attorney General and the 
Department of Criminal Justice Services into a new bureau, the New 
York Law Enforcement Administration (NYLEA), which would be 
situated within the Attorney General’s Office. NYLEA would be led by 
a Deputy Attorney General appointed by the Governor. The agency 
would have the powers of both existing agencies, including the power 
to prosecute officers, to sue departments, to regulate training, and to 
provide grants and technical assistance. It would also have new 
authority to recommend legislation to the state legislature and to pass 
regulations governing police department policies and practices. 
Evaluate the likely advantages and limits of such an agency, using your 
knowledge of the other legal mechanisms for influencing police 
conduct. 
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3. You have been asked to give a speech entitled, “How Legal Regulation 
of the Police Stands Today: The Power and Limits of Law and Legal 
Institutions.” State the thesis of your speech and describe the evidence 
you would use from the course to illustrate your point. 
More recently, I have expanded the focus on doctrine, using a fact pattern 
that described several police-citizen encounters. The newer exam asked 
students about the legality of police conduct, about the likely success of the 
legal proceedings that could follow, and about possible law and policy changes 
that could prevent similar situations. 
In both cases, the students had three hours for the exam. I have thought 
about alternate formats, including the same exams spread over six or twenty-
four hours, but students hate the idea. Overall, the three-hour form works well 
enough, and students prove and sort themselves by the depth, breadth, and 
coherence of their arguments.69 
III.  CONCLUSION 
As my exam suggests, my class considers how we govern policing in the 
United States and how we might do it differently. It is intended to make 
students think about the power of law, including its possibilities and limits. 
The course helps law students see the ways law makes the world and the way it 
sometimes misrepresents it. I hope it arms students to participate intelligently 
in public debate and public policy about law and the police.70 And students 
seem to enjoy the course. 
Still, I am the course’s biggest beneficiary. Working through cases in the 
course—even those I have read dozens of times—has been a continuous source 
of insight. It is as if the light bulb never stops flashing. I test and refine new 
ideas and arguments with students who bring thoughtful views to the mix. I 
have now written a couple of articles based on ideas that grew out of the 
course, and I have several more in the works. However much I enjoy teaching 
Criminal Procedure, it can never provide students with as much understanding 
about law and the police, and it never offers me the same intellectual reward. 
  
 
 69. In my early years teaching the course, students had a lot of anxiety about what they 
should be learning and taking notes about. I forbid computers in the classroom because detailed 
note taking is less helpful than engaged participation in the classroom conversation, and that can 
exacerbate worry about testing. To help ease worry, I put this exam up on the course website 
before the first day of class. 
 70. I used to tell my students that the course was not practical, but I have pulled back on that 
claim as students from the course have gone on to draft state statutes on policing, work in the 
United States Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, and try § 1983 cases, and have said 
that the course helped. 
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